

# Basics I

CSE 40537/60537 Biometrics

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Spring 2020



# Today you will...

*Get to know*

What Biometrics is.

Reasons to use Biometrics.

Biometric traits.

How Biometric systems look like.

# What is Biometrics?



**7 billion people**

Who is this person? (*Identification*)

Is this person Jane Doe? (*Verification*)

Biometrics aims at ***identifying*** or ***verifying*** the claimed or denied identity of an individual based on their *physical, chemical or behavioral* traits.



# What is Biometrics?



In this course, we aim at **computer-aided Biometrics.**

We'll focus on **software solutions** rather than hardware.

But we'll get to use some **cool devices**, I promise.



# What is Biometrics?

## Why computers?

High throughput  
Repeatability  
Predictability  
Accountability






# What is Biometrics?

Identity verification through:



A unique trait  
of yours.



physical



chemical



behavioral



Not something  
you **have**.



Not something  
you **know**.





# Why use Biometrics?

## Consumers prefer biometric authentication to traditional passwords, Visa says

🕒 Jan 6, 2020 | [Chris Burt](#)


CATEGORIES [Biometrics News](#) | [Financial Services](#)



Almost 70 percent of U.S. shoppers did not go through with an online purchase because they either forgot the password, couldn't log in or couldn't receive a one-time passcode, according to research conducted by [Visa](#), while another report from Verizon found that as many as 80 percent of data breaches are caused by compromised and weak passwords.

<https://www.biometricupdate.com/202001/consumers-prefer-biometric-authentication-to-traditional-passwords-visa-says>

# Why use Biometrics?



(CINCINNATI) — An Ohio man who claimed to be a child who disappeared at age 6 pleaded guilty Wednesday to aggravated identity theft and will serve two years in prison, minus time served.

Federal authorities said they were suspicious after he refused to be fingerprinted. DNA testing quickly revealed his true identity.

<https://time.com/5762223/brian-rini-missing-child-pleads-guilty/>



# Why use Biometrics?

**Biometrics is safer**  
**But not absolutely safe!**



<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-21756709>




**A Brazilian doctor faces charges of fraud after being caught on camera using silicone fingers to sign in for work for absent colleagues, police say.**



# Why use Biometrics?

**Biometrics is safer**  
But not absolutely safe!



<https://www.wired.com/story/10-year-old-face-id-unlocks-mothers-iphone-x/>



# Why use Biometrics?

**Biometrics is safer**  
**But not absolutely safe!**



RIO DE JANEIRO (Reuters) - A masked Rio de Janeiro inmate dressed as a woman tried to break out of a Brazilian jail this weekend in a surreal act of derring-do, only to be thwarted on the cusp of freedom by state prison authorities.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-crime/the-man-in-the-plastic-mask-disguised-brazil-inmate-busted-in-brazen-jailbreak-idUSKCN1UV1E6>




# Why use Biometrics?

**Biometrics is safer**  
But not absolutely safe!  
Even humans fail.



<https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/17/politics/report-faults-fbis-fingerprint-scrutiny-in-arrest-of-lawyer.html>



latent  
fingerprint




collected  
fingerprint

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 - The Federal Bureau of Investigation wrongly implicated an Oregon lawyer in a deadly train bombing in Madrid because the F.B.I. culture discouraged fingerprint examiners from disagreeing with their superiors, a panel of forensic experts has concluded.



# Biometrics Use

**Biometrics is a reality**



border patrol




entertainment



# Biometrics Use

**Biometrics is a reality**




personal devices




# Biometrics Use

## Biometrics is a reality



Facebook



Google Photos



# Biometrics Use

**Biometrics is a reality**

**Indian AADHAAR program**

10-year initiative.

1.2 billion people enrolled  
(99% of adult population).

Iris scans, faces, and fingerprints.

Claimed to have saved the  
Indian government \$12.4 billion.



civil rights



# Biometrics Abuse

## Function Creep

Widening of the use of a technology beyond the purpose for which it was originally intended.



US typical example: SSN

The same may happen with Biometric systems.

# Biometrics Abuse

## Function Creep

In 2001, Colorado state was caught selling its DMV\* face and fingerprint databases to corporations.



\*Department of Motor Vehicles

Source: <https://i2i.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/IP-8-2001-1.pdf>



# Biometrics Abuse

## Segregating Profiling



The screenshot shows the top of a Hindustan Times news page. The header includes the 'hindustantimes' logo, a 'Sign In' button, and the date 'Saturday, Jan 11, 2020' with the location 'New Delhi 16°C' and an 'e-paper' link. Below the header is a navigation bar with links to 'discover', 'india', 'cities', 'opinion', 'world', 'cricket', 'entertainment', 'election', 'trending', 'videos', 'tech', and a search icon. The main content area shows a breadcrumb trail: 'Home / Bhopal / Linking benefits for AIDS patients to Aadhaar triggers privacy concerns'. The article title is 'Linking benefits for AIDS patients to Aadhaar triggers privacy concerns'. The sub-headline reads: 'Many patients are avoiding going to hospitals and ATR centres fearing mandatory submission of their Aadhaar number could lead to disclosure of their identity, inviting social stigma.' At the bottom left of the article snippet, there is a 'BHOPAL' tag and an update timestamp: 'Updated: Apr 03, 2017 12:34 IST'.

**hindustantimes** Sign In  
Saturday, Jan 11, 2020 | New Delhi 16°C | e-paper

discover india cities opinion world cricket entertainment election trending videos tech ... Search

Home / Bhopal / Linking benefits for AIDS patients to Aadhaar triggers privacy concerns

### Linking benefits for AIDS patients to Aadhaar triggers privacy concerns

Many patients are avoiding going to hospitals and ATR centres fearing mandatory submission of their Aadhaar number could lead to disclosure of their identity, inviting social stigma.

**BHOPAL** Updated: Apr 03, 2017 12:34 IST

<https://www.hindustantimes.com/bhopal/linking-benefits-for-aids-patients-to-aadhaar-triggers-privacy-concerns/story-iR6HB8RmqPDaNwkX2Oj5EJ.html>

# Biometrics Abuse

## Segregating Profiling

The New York Times

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***China Uses DNA to Map Faces,  
With Help From the West***

Beijing's pursuit of control over a Muslim ethnic group pushes the rules of science and raises questions about consent.

  By Sui-Lee Wee and Paul Mozur

Published Dec. 3, 2019 Updated Dec. 10, 2019

      341

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/business/china-dna-uighurs-xinjiang.html>



# Biometrics Abuse

## Data Leakage

 **NATION**

TRIBUNE INVESTIGATION — SECURITY BREACH

### Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar details

JALANDHAR:It was only last November that the UIDAI asserted that “Aadhaar data is fully safe and secure and there has been no data leak or breach at UIDAI.

Posted: 📅 Jan 04, 2018 02:07 AM (IST)

Updated : ⌚ 2 years ago

 103612  0  0  0

<https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details-523361>

# Biometrics Abuse

## Compromised biometric data

People cannot change their biometric data in response to a leak. Irreversible for whole lifetime.




Please, don't.




# Biometrics Appeal

2017 Forecast




2019 Forecast



Source: Acuity Market Intelligence (<https://www.acuitymi.com/>)  
CAGR: Compound Annual Growth Rate


# Biometric Traits





# Biometric Traits

## Market



Source: Mani and Nadeski, *Processing solutions for biometric systems*, Texas Instruments, 2015

# Biometric Traits

**What do we want to consider?**

Some traits might be more suitable than others.

**Universality (1/8)**

Does everybody have the trait?





# Biometric Traits

**What do we want to consider?**

Some traits might be more suitable than others.

**Uniqueness (2/8)**

How likely two or more individuals will present the same trait?



# Biometric Traits

**What do we want to consider?**

Some traits might be more suitable than others.

**Uniqueness (2/8)**

How likely two or more individuals will present the same trait?



<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/americas/brazil-paternity-dna.html>



# Biometric Traits

**What do we want to consider?**

Some traits might be more suitable than others.

**Uniqueness (2/8)**

How likely two or more individuals will present the same trait?



<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/danvergano/failed-paternity-test-vanished-twin>

# Biometric Traits

**What do we want to consider?**

Some traits might be more suitable than others.

**Permanence (3/8)**

How does the trait change over time?

How can diseases affect the trait?





# Biometric Traits

**What do we want to consider?**

Some traits might be more suitable than others.

**Measurability (4/8)**

How easy is it to acquire and digitize the trait?



# Biometric Traits

**What do we want to consider?**

Some traits might be more suitable than others.

**Acceptability (5/8)**

Will individuals collaborate during data collection?





# Biometric Traits

**What do we want to consider?**

Some traits might be more suitable than others.

**Circumvention (6/8)**

How easy can the trait be forged or imitated?



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIII8L43nng>


# Biometric Traits

**What do we want to consider?**

Some traits might be more suitable than others.

**Accountability (7/8)**

How easy is it for the everyman to understand the trait comparison?






# Biometric Traits

**What do we want to consider?**

Some traits might be more suitable than others.


**Performance (8/8)**

How good is the trait quantitatively according to objective **metrics**?  
(we'll see them soon)



# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment



## Trait Acquisition

We'll have data-collection classes.  
We'll use real-world sensors.


## What to observe?

Sensors have different **quality**  
(in terms of precision, resolution,  
presence of noise, and usability)



# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment



## Trait Enhancement

Noise removal.

Operations to keep only **essential** information (consider universality, uniqueness, permanence, circumvention, accountability, and performance).

Load irises

Load examination

Save examination

Save report

Quit program


Brightness



Contrast



Sharpening



Segment iris


Brightness



Contrast




Sharpening



Segment iris



1x



### Human-Interpretable Features

- |   |   |   |   |   |          |
|---|---|---|---|---|----------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TSHEPII | <input type="checkbox"/> Show Matched   | - | 0 | + | out of 0 |
|   | <input type="checkbox"/> Show Unmatched | - | 1 | + | out of 0 |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SURF    | <input type="checkbox"/> Show Matched   | - | 0 | + | out of 0 |
|   | <input type="checkbox"/> Show Unmatched | - | 1 | + | out of 0 |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Crypts  | <input type="checkbox"/> Show Matched   | - | 0 | + | out of 0 |

- |  |   |   |   |   |          |
|--|---|---|---|---|----------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MSER | <input type="checkbox"/> Show Matched   | - | 0 | + | out of 0 |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> Show Unmatched | - | 1 | + | out of 0 |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SIFT | <input type="checkbox"/> Show Matched   | - | 0 | + | out of 0 |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> Show Unmatched | - | 1 | + | out of 0 |

Undo last removal

### Manual Annotation

Annotate...

- ☒ Matching Regions ☒ Non-Matching Regions
- ☒ Show Matching Regions ☒ Show Non-Matching Regions

### Non-Human-Interpretable Features

Gabor Filters

thr: 0.4461

BSIF Filters


thr: 0.4216

### Global match score



# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Modules



## Feature Extraction


Compact but expressive digital representation of the trait.

## Types

**Handcrafted** or **learned** with machine learning.  
We'll see both cases.

# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Modules




## Template Database

It inherits all the security and privacy issues from database systems. Be careful with invasions, leaks, etc.




# Biometric Systems

## Verification Modules



# Biometric Systems

## Verification Modules




**Feature Matching**  
Comparison of **acquired** and **template** features.




# Biometric Systems

## Verification Modules



# Biometric Systems


## Verification Modules





# Biometric Systems

## Identification Modules



**Gallery**  
Closest  
template  
features to  
query.

# Biometric Systems

## Query and Gallery Example



query




gallery



# Biometric Systems

## Identification Modules



# Biometric Systems

## Open-set Identification



**Query**  
(Liam Hemsworth)

### Dataset



Robert  
Downey Jr.



Scarlet  
Johansson



Chris  
Evans



Mark  
Ruffalo




Chris  
Hemsworth



Jeremy  
Renner

### Feature Space



### Closet Set

**Output**  
This is  
Chris Hemsworth!



### Open Set


**Output**  
I don't know  
this person!






# Biometric Systems

## Identification Modules



# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision




## Attended operation?

“I’m seeing here in my notes that you are already enrolled.”



# Biometric Systems


## Enrollment Revision



**Unattended operation?**  
The system must deal with re-enrollment attempts.

# Biometric Systems


## Enrollment Revision






# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision



# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision



## Fast Enrollment

There might not be time to process these 2 modules. E.g., if you have millions of enrolled users, or a distributed template database.


Feature Matching

Decision



# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision




Trait  
Acquisition

acquired sample, ID

Trait  
Enhancement

enhanced sample, ID



template  
database

feature, ID

Feature  
Extraction

## Fast Enrollment

Possible solution: conclude enrollment after *Feature Extraction*.



Feature  
Matching

Decision

Proceed to *Feature Matching* and *Decision* and take the needed time.

# Biometric Systems

## Enrollment Revision





# Biometric Systems


## Deployment



From all modules integrated within single chips...



To disperse modules independently deployed in diverse platforms.





# Biometric Systems

**What do we want to consider?**

Things to consider when designing a Biometrics system, besides trait.

**Cooperative or non-cooperative users? (1/5)**

Do users want to be identified?

Don't appeal to covert deployment.





# Biometric Systems

**What do we want to consider?**

Things to consider when designing a Biometrics system, besides trait.

**Habituated or non-habituated users? (2/5)**

Do users interact with the system frequently or sporadically?






# Biometric Systems

**What do we want to consider?**

Things to consider when designing a Biometrics system, besides trait.

**Attended or  
unattended operation? (3/5)**

Will somebody be helping users?







# Biometric Systems

**What do we want to consider?**

Things to consider when designing a Biometrics system, besides trait.

**Controlled or uncontrolled environment? (4/5)**

How do the environmental conditions change?  
(temperature, illumination, etc.)





# Biometric Systems

## **What do we want to consider?**

Things to consider when designing a Biometrics system, besides trait.

## **What are the computational requirements? (5/5)**

Consider memory footprint, processing time, response time, and system availability.





# Biometric Systems

What do we want to avoid?

## **✗ Covert deployment**

Users must be aware of the Biometric system collecting their data.  
Respect their privacy.



## **✗ No data confidentiality**

Collected data must be confidential. Avoid function creep.

## **✗ Unsafe system**

We will get to know threats (attacks) that may harm a system's integrity.


# S'up Next?

**Be happy**

Any issues? Please come and talk to me.

**More basics**

Biometric system errors,  
metrics and attacks.





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<https://engineering.nd.edu/profiles/aczajka>  
<https://www.wjscheirer.com/>